Lecture “Slovenian foreign policy at a time of change”

Ljubljana, 3.11.2010  |  speech

Lecture by Dr Danilo Türk, President of the Republic of Slovenia, entitled “Slovenian foreign policy at a time of change” organised by the Club of Former Slovenian Ambassadors, in cooperation with the International Center for Promotion of Enterprises (ICPE), the Slovenian Association for International Relations and the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia
Ljubljana, 3 November 2010



Thank you for you cordial welcome and warm reception. I am very pleased to see how many of you have decided to attend today’s discussion. I must also tell you that I am impressed by the foreign policy think-tank assembled in this room. Before beginning my lecture, I would like to make it clear that it is not my intention systematically to address problems and issues related to Slovenian foreign policy or international issues in any broader sense.

I would like to remind you that I was given a similar opportunity on 14 April last year and that my approach then was based on my view of the state of international relations, especially the state of international security issues at that time. While pondering on how to organize my opening thoughts for today’s discussion, it occurred to me that it might be more appropriate this time to focus on Slovenian foreign policy, without, however, trying to provide a systematic explanation of this policy, but rather by outlining certain experiences and thoughts, which may later enable us to consider together how to go forward. In this context, I would also like to hear your opinions, the opinions of people who critically monitor Slovenian foreign policy.


First of all, though, I must explain two things in relation to the title of my deliberations today. The title that I have chosen is “Slovenian foreign policy at a time of change”. There are two things that need to be explained before I begin my lecture: Slovenian foreign policy and time of change. It seems to me that both these terms deserve an explanation.

When I speak of Slovenian foreign policy, I proceed from the fact that Slovenia is a sovereign state, that Slovenia both needs and has its own foreign policy, and that each Member State of the European Union should proceed from the same basis. In press articles, we sometimes come across opinions about how countries, especially new ones, should actually strive not to have a particularly defined foreign policy but rather let foreign policy affairs be more or less governed by the European Union. This is an unrealistic approach. The European Union is not a state; its aspiration or its yearning for a common foreign policy remains just that – a yearning. It is not up to providing the necessary answers deriving from real needs and does not have clear priorities that could structure it so as to elaborate a common policy. Moreover, it lacks sufficiently uniform positions about the most sensitive political issues. I believe that an assessment of an EU common foreign and security policy requires a high level of realism, and that this realism should form the foundation for establishing a national foreign policy.

In this context, each Member State plays two roles in respect of the European Union. First, they appear in the role of an actor participating in the creation of the EU common foreign policy. The EU common foreign policy is a project in the making and it is only right that all Member States should be a part of and contribute to its creation. This also applies to the Republic of Slovenia. Later in this lecture, I will explain at which points such cooperation could, in my opinion, be of benefit to the Republic of Slovenia and to the European Union as a whole.

Their second role is somewhat different. Each and every EU Member State is – to its own specific extent, of course – also a user of “services” provided by the European Union as a whole. This is particularly true of Slovenia, since we must bear in mind that Slovenia has been involved in one of the more serious foreign political issues, i.e., the resolution of the border dispute with neighbouring Croatia. In 2009, and even now, in 2010, Slovenia has benefited from certain European Union "services" – if you don’t mind me using this somewhat freely selected term. The European Union intervened through the European Commission in drawing up an arbitration agreement. Both diplomatically and technically, this was a demanding and very well accomplished task, which has contributed to the achievement of an agreement that provides a framework for the subsequent settlement of the border issue. We must be grateful to the European Commission for the work well done.

The second introductory explanation concerns changes. What am I meaning when I say a time of change? With regard to a hypothetical definition of this time of change, it is appropriate to say that the economic crisis into which the world slid at the end of 2008 and in 2009 has ended an extended period following the cold war, a period that could be defined as a time of optimism. That was a period in which the international community failed to create a robust system of international relations to replace the rigidity that had existed during the cold war, which, in many respects, had obviously not been positive. The transition period of two decades after the cold war, however, brought many positive things. We must not forget that the number of armed conflicts throughout the world significantly decreased in this period and that we have witnessed many improvements, including some improvements in the field of economic relations and, to some extent, also a reduction of global poverty. However, this period failed to provide a firm system of international relations and ended with a crisis that has opened a new chapter.

From the point of view of the European Union – to return to the fundamental institutional framework which we constantly bear in mind in Slovenia – the period that I would call a period of institutional optimism is coming to an end. The belief prevailed for a long time in the European Union that the institutions it is developing are, in themselves, the essential or even decisive factors in co-creating or creating EU foreign policy and significantly contribute to the establishment of the European Union as a global player. I believe that the Copenhagen experience at the end of last year and current experience have shown that there is nothing automatic in this respect and that the institutions as such do not ensure such a role.

We can say that we knew this all along, that we have always been aware that the institutions do not in themselves play a decisive role in the field of international relations. However, it must be understood that the European Union is a system whose origin is explicitly rational, which is highly dependent on norms and institutions, and which constantly expects a lot from these norms and institutions.

This institutional optimism, which governed the development of the European Union through the nineties and the first decade of the 21st century, is now slowly coming to an end. This is also clear from the fact that only a year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is already the subject of discussion on its revision. That is to say, doubts have already arisen after such a short time about an institutional framework whose establishment took so long. Of course, you can say that the proposal for revision is connected with financial matters and that this might not be all that relevant from the perspective of the common foreign and security policy. However, I warn you that we should not underestimate a problem deriving from the fact that so shortly after its entry into force, this fundamental legal framework of the European Union, the Treaty of Lisbon, is already subject to revision. The authority of the Treaty is already undermined. The European Union will now need to be highly inventive in creating the political will to ensure a step forward, in both financial and foreign policy matters. As always, this political will have to come from the EU Member States. This is not the first time the EU is facing difficulty. Let us recall the era of "Eurosclerosis" a generation ago. A renewed effort and mobilization of political will was necessary to move forward.


It is certainly not my wish to replace institutional optimism with institutional pessimism. These ever-changing conditions also provide us with new opportunities. One of them is the increasing role of certain players in the field of international relations that have been present on the scene in the past: for example, Russia or the emerging and ever stronger role of Turkey, as well as other phenomena that require our attention and need to be taken advantage of as opportunities for the foreign policy of the EU Member States and the European Union as a whole. In short, I am not advocating the replacement of institutional optimism with institutional or any other kind of pessimism, but would instead like us to try and realistically assess the opportunities brought to us by the new times.

Allow me now to briefly provide you with some insights into the foreign policy of the Republic of Slovenia from the time since our last meeting in April 2009 until today. As I said earlier, the intention of my opening thoughts today is not to provide a systematic analysis but rather to present some points that seem to me relevant and worthy of consideration.


Firstly, it is generally accepted that Slovenia has made progress in developing relations with all of its neighbours. This, of course, is particularly true of our relations with the neighbouring Republic of Croatia, but also applies to the development of relations with the Italian Republic. To this end, I would like to highlight the meeting between the three Presidents in Trieste in July this year, which is an expression of this progress and needs to be recognized. I would also like to highlight the outstandingly good relations with the Republic of Hungary and good relations with the Republic of Austria. It needs to be observed that Slovenia – viewed objectively – has a relatively friendly immediate neighbourhood. We have a history, of course, that sometimes gives us reason to claim that there is always room for insecurity; but let us think critically and ask ourselves: Do not our neighbours actually create a friendly European environment for Slovenia's foreign policy? Is it not true that much indeed depends on whether we also continue to conduct good policy within this environment in the future?

In terms of the European regional framework, this period has furthermore been marked by a promising development of relations with the Russian Federation from both economic and political points of view. In this period, like other European states, we have had interesting communication with Russia regarding ideas on the new European security architecture. This is a topic that is currently being discussed and will be discussed even more in the future. It is only right that Slovenia should be part of this discussion. It is not necessary to expect highly significant prompt changes or very important imminent actions. Nevertheless, it is a legitimate discussion, the discussion is here and now and it is right that Slovenia is part of it. We are preparing an official presidential visit to Russia, to which I will return later in this speech and which is the result of positive communication between the two countries over approximately the past year, communication that promises good progress.

The Republic of Turkey – we have developed very good cooperation at the political as well as certain practical levels. I would like to note that, within the course of a year, we have made a presidential visit to Turkey and received a return visit to Slovenia, on both occasions with the participation of businessmen and delegations, and that we are engaged in a discussion with Turkey concerning specific crisis regions, as well as security issues that concern both Slovenia and the wider European area. Viewed realistically, Turkey is becoming an increasingly important actor in the Balkans and is a relevant actor in the regions bordering Turkey; it is therefore right that Slovenia is fostering communication with this significant country as an active and interested partner. I certainly don’t want to create any illusions about the potential importance of this communication I do, however, wish to emphasize that this is part of an imperative, legitimate discussion of our time, and it is appropriate for Slovenia to be part of it.

We have also developed good communication in the Middle East, with high-level visits to and from Israel (think of the visit paid by President Shimon Peres), Egypt (visit by Hosni Mubarak), Jordan and Qatar. I would like to draw special attention to the fact that this year, 2010, we have had a presidential visit to Qatar and Kuwait and a return visit by the Emir of Qatar to Slovenia, and that this has resulted in many interesting projects which will require a long-term commitment.

Slovenia has also launched a humanitarian project in this period, which is not particularly broad in scope but technically highly demanding. It is intended to help children, victims of the Gaza Strip conflict. There is a group of children visiting Slovenia for treatment purposes at this very moment. Including them, the total number of disabled children who have come to Slovenia to undergo highly demanding therapeutic treatment has reached 60. We believe that, on the basis of this project, we will be able to develop on-the-spot humanitarian assistance in Gaza and Palestine and, by doing so, we hope to contribute to establishing an image of Slovenia as a country that is technically competent and politically sensitive enough to be included in diplomatically and medically demanding humanitarian projects. I believe that there is potential here that can be further developed in the future.

We are creating a new momentum in the field of economic diplomacy. These are activities whose concept and focus are, of course, not new. Slovenia has a history of economic diplomacy that should not be underestimated. However, its needs are currently greater than in the past and I believe that in this time, in this past year, we have made some progress in this area, too.

What are the areas in which we have not made enough progress? In my opinion, one of the essential areas in which Slovenian foreign policy has not been sufficiently active is that of Central and Eastern Europe. There is no doubt that we have good communications and excellent relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the potential of this area exceeds the current capacities of Slovenian foreign policy and I believe that, in this context, it is this potential that needs to be considered in the future.

We need to be aware at all times that Slovenia, by its geopolitical definition, is a country of three identities. It is a Balkan country, a Central European country and a Mediterranean country. It is therefore appropriate that its foreign policy should be active in all three directions. As I have already said, this is the policy of a sovereign country that is realistic in setting its goals and refrains from unrealistic or overambitious goals but nevertheless wishes to have a comprehensive foreign policy to meet the interests of a sovereign country.

If we look at this “snapshot”, at this quick review of Slovenian foreign policy, in slightly more general terms, I think it is safe to conclude that Slovenian foreign policy has been active throughout this time and that its priorities are set. The question is whether it is sophisticated enough in its views and implementation and whether it is ambitious enough to correspond to the time of change. These are all legitimate questions and, of course, one of the reasons why I have so gladly agreed to a conversation with you is to hear critical remarks.


Let me move on to the second part of my talk and say a few words about how I picture and where I see opportunities and needs for the future development of Slovenian foreign policy. Questions for the future can be divided into two parts: into a more general view of the foreign political, particularly trans-European security and political context, within which Slovenian foreign policy will move in the coming period, and into certain tasks that I believe will be prioritised in the future.


Let us first look at the general context. Without wishing to provide an overall analysis but to identify certain interesting aspects of this context based on an experiential approach, I would say firstly that we should take note of two interesting initiatives by the Russian Federation which open up the possibility of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union, as well as between the Russian Federation and the Member States of the European Union. The first initiative relates to the policy of modernising Russia and the second is the initiative for a new European security architecture, put forward by President Dmitry Medvedev. Neither of these initiatives is definite or final; neither is something that could be defined as a fully known category, as containing fully known qualities. Nevertheless, both are interesting as opportunities and as an invitation to cooperation and debate between partners. Here is an opportunity Europe must not miss. Europe must understand the seriousness of these initiatives and establish an appropriate partnership. I believe it is appropriate that, in designing its common foreign and security policy, the European Union should make establishing relations with Russia and the countries of the Eastern Partnership its first priority. I believe that the potential and the need to be active are here the strongest and, moreover, that the long-term strategic future of Europe indeed depends on this cooperation.

Within this framework, Slovenia has the opportunity to become actively involved. As I pointed out earlier, we are preparing a presidential visit which, among other things, is expected to result in a joint Slovenian-Russian declaration on cooperation for modernisation, and several specific agreements to provide concrete economic and other support for this cooperation. The work has made good progress and I am optimistic. I hope we manage to set up a sound system of agreements that will provide a framework for our future cooperation. In its efforts within the European Union, Slovenia should promote faster visa liberalisation for the countries in this area. I think that this is a field in which Slovenia has a legitimate possibility and perhaps even a right, and that it is expected to be among the more actively engaged countries when it comes to visa liberalisation as a general political priority in relation to the eastern European area, that is to say, when it comes to countries of the Eastern Partnership and Russia.

Slovenia has shown its initiative regarding visa liberalisation in the Balkans and it has been shown that it is possible to make progress in this regard. The situation is obviously not identical, but what is comparable is the need to articulate a clear common political will for the improvement of human communications. We must not allow the prevalence of partial interests in these issues, interests that are related to crime prevention, to security problems as seen by security agencies. It needs to be understood that freedom of movement is a human right and that freedom of movement is not complete if it does not allow travel without unnecessary administrative restrictions. In addition, to enable broader, more ambitious cooperation of the European Union with this eastern European area, it is necessary to ensure also a broader base of human contacts, broader than that which we have today. If we want fully to exploit the potential within these relations, and all the opportunities for business, scientific and other kinds of cooperation, then we must open these channels. We must open them much wider than they are at present. It used to be generally believed that the Berlin Wall had divided Europe in a brutal and damaging way. It was later generally believed that Europe would not build new Berlin walls. Both are true; but time requires further steps. Time requires changes that will open this area for broader human communication, for the establishment of an improved base of future relations and for the exploitation of the full potential.

Finally, talking of opportunities: at the beginning of this December, the OSCE Summit will take place in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana. The question of the location of this summit was the subject of interesting debates for the past year and more. The initiative to hold the summit in Kazakhstan, a country that currently holds the presidency of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, came from the country itself. The initiative was initially greeted with a high level of distrust. During my official visit into Kazakhstan approximately a year ago, I supported this initiative at once. I did this because I was sure that it was time for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe to recognize the huge importance of the Central Asian area for the future stability of Euro-Asian as well as Euro-Atlantic regions, that it was necessary to provide a new start, which would enable the creation of the political will for better integration of this area in the entire system of European security and cooperation for which the OSCE has been striving. More must be done here.

The question, of course, is what that more should be. We have not come very far in this matter. The documents drafted during the previous preparatory stages have provided us with no definite answers for the future and neither will the Astana Summit scheduled for the beginning of December be able to do so. Nevertheless, I believe this summit will enable three things. First of all, it will facilitate serious discussion about new security mechanisms and a possible revision of existing ones. During the OSCE summit in Istanbul, a system for the regulation of relations in the field of conventional weapons was established that is still in force today. This system needs to be reviewed and it must be established whether there is anything that needs to be changed. Secondly, a good combination needs to be found, a good way of linking the so-called hard instruments of international security, those that are related to the use of armed forces and to preventive diplomatic activity in relation to the use of armed forces, with soft security instruments, with the provision of human rights, strengthening democracy and other soft security instruments in general. There has, of course, been on-going discussion on this topic within the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; however, this discussion requires a new initiative and the Astana Summit will provide an opportunity to present one. Finally, the OSCE will have to take a good look at so-called “frozen conflicts” that influence the situation in the entire area covered by this organisation.

We have somehow accepted that some problems remain unsolved for a very long time. The oldest of these is Cyprus, followed by the issues of Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and, of course, Transnistria. The question arising from this is whether it was not precisely the way of addressing these problems used until now that caused a situation in which the international community and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe have somehow surrendered to the fact that there has been no real progress so far in solving these problems? Is it not perhaps time for a stronger initiative in order for a start to be made at some point in solving these problems?

From this perspective, I must say that, as so many other observers and readers of the documents, I was pleasantly encouraged by the joint message of Presidents Sarkozy and Medvedev and Chancellor Merkel in Deauville, France, on 19 October this year. The three Presidents at that time established in their declaration on the approach to certain security issues and particularly highlighted the issue of Transnistria as one whose resolution needs to be prioritised and which, of course, is of a test nature, is a test case in the field of solving so-called frozen conflicts also in a wider sense. I certainly do not underestimate the difficulties involved. I do not underestimate these problems at all. However, the political development outlined in this introduction expresses the possibility as well as the need to address frozen conflicts with more determination and to articulate a stronger political will in regard to this matter.


So much about the general aspects of the international situation that Slovenia must consider and in which it should be actively involved. If we ask which tasks should be among the more important of Slovenian foreign policy in the coming period – and e I will end my introductory thoughts with this – I would, naturally, first have to say something general. Any foreign policy is based on the geopolitical reality of the country whose policy is at issue, and any foreign policy is imbued with the values to which the country at issue is committed. Slovenia, of course, adheres to certain fundamental values and knows how to articulate them and how to act according to these values in international relations – on the basis of compliance with international law, on the basis of adherence to human rights, on the basis of the promotion of effective progress in the field of democracy and the related security. These are important values and Slovenian foreign policy is capable of integrating them into its activities; so we can discuss this in more concrete terms.

I would particularly like to highlight four tasks of Slovenian foreign policy: First of all, Central and Eastern Europe. I am returning here to an issue that I consider very relevant within the European security and political context. I believe that Slovenia could and should do more in this area. This applies to strengthening its political consultations with the Visegrad Group and the Baltic countries and its cooperation in the Danube region within EU policy. We should not underestimate the fact that Slovenia is the depository of the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin. The Sava River is one of the major tributaries of the Danube River and the relevant ecological issues have a strong impact on the Danube regions to be considered by the EU in developing its policy in relation to this area. Slovenia must therefore be involved in this activity soon and sufficiently actively. Finally, within its policy in relation to the Central European area, Slovenia should invest as much energy as possible into making the European Union realize and accept that an orientation towards the east should be a matter of priority.

Secondly, I would like to highlight the Balkans. I have intentionally avoided mentioning it first, since the Balkans is an area in which we have been and remain actively involved. As a result, it has been often suggested that Slovenia holds a special position and plays a special role in the Balkans. In my opinion, we should be realistic from this point of view and should not attach greater significance to our role than it can actually have. I think that we should be capable of clearly defining our positions and developing our approach to various issues related to the Western Balkans, and we must fully understand which instruments to use with which issues. If, in this context, we think of the need for direct negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, that is to say a task that is accepted in the European area and at the global level as a common, important task for the future period, then Slovenia must of course realistically define its role in this matter. In my opinion, this means that it is right for Slovenia to be included in the process of strengthening communications and conditions facilitating dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. However, Slovenia should pursue this goal primarily through the European Union, since it is the European Union that should act here as the driving force of communication between Belgrade and Pristina and as an agent who should play a decisive international role in making sure that this communication is launched smoothly. This does not mean that the role of other relevant actors who will be involved in addressing these issues, primarily the United States but also Russia and Turkey, is any less important. In short, this is an issue and undoubtedly one of the most sensitive political issues of contemporary Europe, in which Slovenia should clearly define its role and connect it, in particular, to strengthening the European Union and its tasks for the future.

As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, one should consider the extreme sensitivity of the current situation in this country as the result of the recent parliamentary elections. We must realize that certain political changes, especially in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will be necessary in order to take into account the altered political relations reflected by the results of the elections. This debate will clearly be held within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Enhancement of the social democratic option and changes withinthe leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina will require time and a certain amount of patience from the international community. The necessary constitutional changes, however, will need to be handled with the utmost sensitivity and prudence. Haste is not an option. We must, of course, not miss the moment at which something important could happen. However, this moment has not yet come. In this regard, too, Slovenia, I believe, will have to coordinate its activities carefully with those of other international actors, especially the European Union.

The third priority that I believe deserves greater input of energy is the Mediterranean. We have become accustomed to speaking of the Adriatic-Ionian initiative as a practical project that contains certain possibilities but mostly restrictions. We should not be led to believe that this project is incapable of producing any important practical results. However, we do have to understand that as long as such serious and such profoundly unsolved issues as that ofPalestine exist, there is no chance of success for any major projects within the Mediterranean region. Even the Euro-Mediterranean Union cannot produce any real results as long as the Palestinian issue is in its current state. On the one hand, therefore, we need to be realistic when assessing the overall Mediterranean political context and, on the other we need to understand that it is possible for Slovenia to become active in the Mediterranean area, too. As I said earlier, by providing humanitarian assistance in Palestine we are trying to show how keenly and deeply interested we are and that, within our powers, we can help. There have been several situations in the United Nations in which Slovenia has presented clearly articulated views, even more than was typical of the European Union in general and in which it has clearly stated that the Palestinian issue must be addressed differently than has been the case so far. In short, we have a heterogeneous spectrum of tasks in the Mediterranean area but it is a priority that we must not neglect.

Finally, my fourth and final point: engagement in international institutions. So far, Slovenia has proven to be a relatively successful country in the international institutions. We must not underestimate the results we have already produced. We must not underrate ourselves. We have produced results in the past and we will continue to do so in the future. From this point of view, it seems appropriate for me to say that I support the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia, who announced at this year’s session of the United Nations General Assembly in September that Slovenia is a candidate for non-permanent membership of the Security Council. This is certainly an important announcement and an important commitment. It is now essential to conduct a carefully thought out, well orchestrated and well implemented election campaign and to define our position on issues on the Security Council’s agenda in a way that will enable us to work successfully in the Security Council.

Slovenia was already a member of the Security Council twelve years ago and a successful one, too. I believe that we have every chance of being successful again today, both in the elections and during our membership of the Security Council. Since you all know that I feel an attachment to the United Nations and that I am, if you will, politically and emotionally devoted to the UN, I must make it clear that the idea of applying for membership of the Security Council was not mine. First of all, this idea was adopted when I was no longer a member of the Slovenian diplomatic corps. It was adopted by a circle of people whose discussions I did not attend. However, I believe it was a good decision and I supported it at the time it was adopted and still do so today. I also wish, during the remaining time, that is this year and until the elections scheduled for October 2011, for Slovenia to act successfully and efficiently. We must understand that, if we succeed, we will be faced with interesting tasks within the Security Council and that these tasks will link us even closer to the issues about which I have been talking and, of course, to many more.

Let me conclude by emphasizing once more that my contribution today was envisaged as a deliberation on a set of questions that have occurred to me while monitoring and taking part in the formulation and implementation of Slovenian foreign policy. I believe that, in this respect, I have provided you with sufficient starting-points for your questions and comments. Foreign policy is undoubtedly a complex process that requires the engagement of many. As has already been published, I believe in the understanding of foreign policy as a setting in which many actors appear. Nobody should ascribe to himself a central role. We must all be prepared to listen to other people. I have appeared today before this eminent audience to present my views, to provide answers to your questions and critical observations and also to learn something interesting from you.

Thank you.