Lecture "Which Way to Go: Necessities and Realities of UN Reform"

London, 26.3.2010  |  speech

Lecture by Dr Danilo Türk, President of the Republic of Slovenia, at the Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs): "Which Way to Go: Necessities and Realities of UN Reform"
London, 26 March 2010


Ladies and Gentlemen,

It's great honour and privilege to be here at Chatham House. It's always a privilege to participate in the work of Chatham House, but it's special pleasure to see so many friends from the UN days. Obviously, as I look around the table and see all this old UN hands and experienced diplomats, then it becomes clear that my task today is not an easy one. I'm supposed to talk about UN reform. I have chosen this subject primarily because I think this is a subject that should not be neglected. But at the same time, this is a subject, which is very well known, which has been discussed for many years and where there has been a degree of scepticism, which has developed over time. I think that we have to be critical, which is necessary in order to really come to the core of the problems, but at the same time we have to be constructive. We have to see how to move the international institutional setting ahead.

If I tried to define the problem to be discussed, I could use an architectural metaphor, which was used recently in a book, in a new book by Douglas Hurd, which you may have seen already. "Choose Your Weapons" is the title of the book and it is a book about the history of foreign secretaries of the United Kingdom. Douglas Hurd says the following thing about the international institutions. He says that after World War II the international institutions, which were created at the time, "were buildings, which were built to provide shelter from war between states and from disorder within states". He says that international institutions should not be compared to living creatures and the laws of Darwinian science do not apply to them, but that they should be compared with edifices, with buildings and, as Douglas Hurd says and I quote: "This buildings are no longer fit for the purpose. We patch and repair them as best as we can and we make a great many speeches. But it often seams that a deterioration advances faster than the repair work does, as seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, which followed Bosnia and Rwanda." This is one way of looking at the reforms and the international institutions.

There are other ways as well. One of them is to recognise that in fact the whole history of international institutions is a history of a struggle between relevance of those institutions and the danger of their irrelevance. They have been created for a certain purpose, but it has never been quite possible to define that purpose with a necessary precision for an extended period of time and they were always exposed to different challenges, which were not expected. Therefore their struggle has been a struggle for relevance.

There were periods of very high relevance of the United Nations and I think that it is worth reminding ourselves of that as well. If one thinks about the period immediately following the Cold War and a variety of new ideas which were raised at that time and, for example, the practical effects of the UN´s decisions that were shown in the first Gulf War and it’s immediate aftermath, one could say that then the UN proved to be an extremely relevant organisation and also one, which created great hopes. If one thinks about Butros Butros-Gali, the Secretary General of the UN, and his agenda for peace (1992), one would see that the very ambitious programme of reforms has resulted from that. However, subsequent developments proved that those reforms were not easily achievable.

I chose this subject today also because I believe that all the international discussions on UN reform have to take advantage of the political and intellectual energy of the United Kingdom. I’m saying this after careful reflection. This is not only courtesy to the host; it is also a reality, which I have witnessed when I worked at the United Nations. When I served on the Security Council in the years 1998 and 1999, the UK delegation produced resolutions "at an industrial scale". There were quite a few situations at the time, which required very careful judgement and very careful definition of policies and I think that at that time we have seen the advantages of an experienced diplomacy with a very long history of dealing with international crisis and the advantages such a system can offer to the United Nations as a whole. Also in the discussions on reform, the UK views have always been very thoughtful and very helpful, so I think that it makes sense to speak about the subject here and also to invite all of you who are creating this political and intellectual energy.

This I wanted to say more or less by way of introduction. I would also like to say that UN reform in addition to being understood in different ways, naturally, has different meanings and every discussant has to decide what kind of meaning would want to be given to the concept of reform. In my opinion, based on my experience with the United Nations, there are three meanings, which are quite important for any discussion today. First, reform in the UN is about practice and innovation. UN reform is something that is taking place, is practical and is innovative. And we must not neglect that dimension in any discussion, because things have changed. They have changed in various ways, sometimes in significant and very meaningful ways. Second, reform has to be seen also as a systemic challenge, as a challenge to the system as a whole. The practices, which change the UN affect a part of the system, but then they produce an effect on the system as a whole and it's good to step back and look at what kind of effect was produced and what a desired effect for the future needs to be. The third element, which must never be neglected, is that reform is a matter of power. UN is a political system. And therefore political power and all the ingredients of political power play a very significant role in any discussion and in any action related to UN reform.

Since I started my talk with an architectural metaphor borrowed from Douglas Hurd, I would like to say a few words about these three dimensions of reform and start each of them with an architectural metaphor, which is different in each of these cases. First, if one talks about reform as practice and innovation, one can say that the UN over time has looked like a process of construction of a multitude of huts and tents. There were small things, which were created or larger things, some of them solid, some of them less solid. So today it looks like a system of huts and tents, which have been created over time.

We have to recognise that UN has changed from an organisation, which was convener of conferences and producer of norms to a very operational system, a system, which is devoting most of it's energy to operational work.

If one looks at the budget of the UN, one can see that the so called regular budget is less than one quarter of total UN system spending and that specialised and trust funds, which have been established over time, in total, are larger than the regular budget is. Not to speak about the peace-keeping budget, which, of course, is much larger than the regular budget. So we come to a situation at which the regular budget, which is financing the core functions of the institution, represents about 20% of the total spending, and then 30% would be for the specialized and trust funds and 50% for the peace keeping. That tells us quite a bit about how the system has been developed. If one looks at the situation of the personnel, one would see that about one third of the personnel works at the four headquarters in New York, Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi, but two thirds work in the field, in various field missions, development, humanitarian and other fields and that does not include peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping missions are separate and, of course, they are much larger. There are about 120.000 peacekeepers today. So by far the largest element in the system is the peacekeeping.

We also have to understand that all this was happening at the time when the regular budget was under the rule of zero nominal growth. The organisation doesn't have the authority to borrow or to seek resources outside the contribution system. So, the system of financing is designed in a way, which on the one hand limits the ability of the core bureaucracy of the UN to expand while on the other hand it stimulates a variety of project oriented operations and financing of them. And that has created a practice, which has changed the system and which has made it to look like a multitude of huts and tents.

Obviously, the picture projected through this rather simplistic architectural metaphor, is not complete because some of the changes were very significant, very large and could not be described as "huts "or "tents". The International Criminal Court, for example, is something in a separate league altogether. But the way, in which this part of the system was created, has also been typical. It started with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, which was necessitated by the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the inability of the UN to stop that war. When, as a result of that, a new atmosphere was created, it allowed the international community to conclude the treaty, the statute of the International Criminal Court and, what was really very surprising, it made it possible for the statute to enter into force already after four years. 60 ratifications were made in the period between 1998 and 2002. So this was a major achievement, which gives a very important new additional dimension to the UN system and of course that shouldn't be described as either a hut or a tent, but something much larger, much more solid and much more durable.

This brings me to the second notion of UN reform, reform as a systemic challenge. Here I would like to use a different architectural metaphor. Those of you who have been - and I believe all of you have been - to the UN headquarters in New York know how second floor looks. This is the floor at which you enter the conference rooms of the principal organs of the UN. There is an entrance into the General Assembly, then Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council and Security Council. These are the principal organs under the UN Charter. But when one walks daily through the second floor, which is what I used to do for quite a number of years, one realises that architecture doesn't reflect the reality any more, because the Trusteeship Council really hosts all kinds of meetings that are held there and have no relation to once important UN function - administration of trust territories.

In passing, I note that the Security Council is very jealous and very particular by not allowing anybody else to sit in its Conference Room. On the other hand, the Trusteeship Council has faded away. It no longer exists in a practical sense. It exists legally, but it's not active any more. And then one asks, about changing the system of principal organs. We have this Conference Room, which was originally designed to be the room of the Trusteeship Council, but there is no need for trusteeship anymore. So it occurred to me, when I was walking those corridors, that in fact it would be good to elevate the Human Rights Commission to the level of the Human Rights Council, to the level of one of the principal organs, which would be a very natural development. Today the world is characterised by sovereign states. These sovereign states have accepted human rights as a major international theme, which has to be given permanent attention and therefore it would look very natural that Trusteeship Council is abolished or left somewhere in a museum and Human Rights Council established in its place. The architectural dimension here plays a role in that thinking. Indeed in 2005 Human Rights Council was created, though not as a principal organ, but as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, which is a little higher than the functional commission of ECOSOC, which the Commission of Human Rights earlier had been. The newly established Council started some interesting and quite innovative practices.

I would like to mention one of them. I am sure that you are familiar with the procedures and practices of the Human Rights Council. It is conducting something called Universal Periodic Review. It reviews the human rights situations in all the Member States of the United Nations. When the Council was created it was felt that one of the rules governing that process should be that the reviewers are reviewed first. In other words, that those who become members of the Human Rights Council allow their human rights situations to be discussed early at time when they are members of the Council so that there is a greater sense of equal treatment of all states. That, I think, is a very valid principle, one which has to be upheld. I myself would like that practice of the Human Rights Council also to include the rule of no immediate re-election, so that we have a situation when no country can become a de facto permanent member of the Human Rights Council. Rotation has to be sufficiently frequent which would allow the system to project a sense of equal treatment to all members of the United Nations. This is very difficult to achieve. It's not achieved at present and I even hear suggestions that after a period of Universal Periodic Review there should be something like "graduation", that some countries would be seen as sufficiently mature and sufficiently free from criticism that their reports would no longer need to be considered. I think that that would be a very wrong approach to take. I think no "graduation" is possible. One has to be vigilant and one has to look at all human rights problems in all countries of the world. The Universal Periodic Review is important as a universal procedure.

I know that at present there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the level of achievement of the Human Rights Council so far, but I would suggest that we be patient in that regard and that we are realistic in a sense that UN cannot avoid being a political place and therefore politics will have a role in all discussions, including those on human rights. Of course, that means that countries, which take human rights seriously, should be thinking about how to organise themselves, how best to define their priorities, how to make sure that they have a coherent human rights agenda. They also need to develop a proper network of communications, which allows them to be effective in a political body, which every organ of the United Nations consisting of representatives of states naturally is.

I would like to conclude this part of my presentation by saying: The three council system of the United Nations, which Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, has suggested in his report on the UN reform of 2005 as an ideal for the future, is something that is worth thinking about. The Human Rights Council as the most innovative element in that picture requires further attention and, I hope, further strengthening. It has to be raised to a level of expectations, which have accompanied its creation.

The third aspect of reform is reform as a matter of political power. This is very obvious. I would like to use another architectural metaphor in this context. As you know, right now the UN headquarters in New York is being refurbished. At present, after 60-something years, the UN has come to a point in which a major, general refurbishing of the building is taking place. As you know, the need for general repair of the UN building has been discussed for a long time and the absence of a major intervention has been criticised for many years. But now it's taking place so maybe the moment is ripe to talk about changing the UN system in a more ambitious way.

Obviously, the most ambitious element in this picture is the reform of the Security Council. This is something, which has been discussed very intensely for the last 20 years. There is a working group, which has been established in 1992 and has worked since then and has addressed both questions of working methods of the Security Council, which have changed, which are very different now from what they were some 20 years ago, and also the question of the composition of the Security Council. With respect to the latter we do not see any real progress and one can understand the hesitations, which exist, because a major intervention in the structure of the Security Council would be addressing one of the vital, probably the most vital function of the organisation. One must understand that this is sensitive and that in doubt governments would prefer to keep status quo as opposed to change.

But in my opinion change has to happen. I would just like to very briefly say what I think that change might be as far as the composition is concerned. I belong to those who believe that there should be new permanent members of the Security Council. I believe that there should be up to six (6) new permanent members of the Security Council, all of them without the right to veto. I think veto is something that should be left in the Charter where it is and should not be expanded. I believe that there also has to be a very close look at the way non-permanent members rotate and that it would be possible to develop a system of two types of rotation - frequent rotation and ordinary rotation. I think that there are quite a few countries, which might be interested and also entitled to a more frequent rotation given their potential and their contribution to international peace and security. Those countries could be elected in a group of twelve (12) countries that would alternate. Every other term they would alternate among themselves, which means that you would get six (6) additional frequently rotating non-permanent members. If that was doable, which of course politically is not easy to do but it's not inconceivable either, then what would be left is a need for a slight expansion in the ordinary rotating membership, which means, in my opinion, up to eight (8).

The maximum total number would be twenty-five (25) members of the Security Council - five (5) current permanent members, six (6) new permanent members, six (6) frequently rotating non-permanent members and eight (8) ordinarily rotating non-permanent members. That would be a composition, which would, I think, reflect the realities of the world today.

I know that this kind of thinking is seen as typical of professors. Professors like to produce ideas and design schemes. You around the table are diplomats, politicians, critical thinkers and I'm sure that you have very sceptical views of what I've just said. But the purpose for which I decided to say it nevertheless is that we have to have models. If we don't have models we are not likely to be able to agree on anything at any point. And I know that there are alternative models that have been proposed in the past, that there are provisional models that are being proposed and that there are those who believe that no change to the system should occur. That's all true and I do not deny it. What I'm trying to say is simply that we need to think about the UN system as something that has to adjust to the general realities of our time. Those realities have changed and innovation is necessary.

I have spoken for more than 20 minutes already. I'm not going to talk about other aspects of reform, which may be many, some of which may be actually very interesting at this point of time. Let me only mention on a pertinent example. I believe that many of you are thinking about how to move ahead after Copenhagen. The Climate Change Conference at Copenhagen produced an outcome, which is not satisfactory to anybody, which is not insignificant, which is not without potential, but the major problem on how to move ahead and what can be expected at the next phase remains. We can see that there is a degree of pessimism setting in and the more time has lapsed the more pessimism one can see. I think that this is not healthy. One would need to figure out what methods of work should be proposed for the future so as to come to a meaningful agreement at some point in the future.

I think about one aspect in particular. Climate change is something that relates to a variety of very different constituencies, not only sovereign states, not only developed countries and developing countries. One also has to think about the business sector and a variety of specialised organisations such as International Maritime Organisation, which is based in London, which did not have a real voice in this process so far. How does one do it? How does one provide space and an organisational mechanism, which would give the right kind of voice to a variety of actors which have a real stake in the questions of global warming? What kind of improvements are necessary? Not all the views have had the opportunity to be properly expressed in the process so far.

My thinking is that one would really need innovation in terms of organising the negotiating process so as to bring all these interests into the picture and also process them in a manner, which would lead to a coherent agreement at the end. That, of course, would call for innovative lawyers and a careful preparatory activity.

This is where I would like to stop. I have spoken for almost 25 minutes and I shall be looking forward to your comments and if you have any questions I'll try to answer them. Thank you very much.