“We can never again live together”. Such is the most commonly heard statement of the past ten years in the Balkans, particularly in the area of former Yugoslavia. This simple statement tells the whole dreadful truth about the Balkan crisis. It is the greatest victory for the policies of Slobodan Milosevic and the regime which he embodies. And the acquiescence and acceptance of his position would be the greatest defeat for the fundamental values of the European democratic tradition and ideals espoused by the idea of the post-Berlin Wall United Europe, of peace, cooperation and tolerance.

So what, then, is the task of people who desire a peaceful and secure future, along with prosperity and creative work for all European people without difference - including the Balkans? It is my firm belief that this task is to replace the fatal statement “We can never again live together” with the statement that “We must live together”. We are duty bound to help the people of the Balkans to find a formula for a life together, in which they will not live one against the other, and not merely one beside the other, but comfortably one together with the other.

This is a task upon which much more depends than simply the fate of people in the Balkans; perhaps even more than simply the fate of people in Europe. This is the history of the future. Where this will lead us now depends in great measure also on European social democracy. For it holds many political, economic and security instruments. Kosovo is a test of its political wisdom and principles. Nor do I doubt that it respects entirely the importance of the Euro-Atlantic alliance for European security and the experience of that alliance in the Balkan crisis, especially in NATO’s confrontation in Kosovo. Indeed it was in Kosovo that the conviction was enshrined whereby basic human rights are a value that is greater than the sovereignty of a state, and henceforth flagrant and mass violations of basic human rights can no longer be hidden behind national sovereignty or justified by the argument that this is an internal affair of a sovereign state. These principles cannot be limited to special situations and merely to Kosovo or Serbia. Here we may see the beginning of a new chapter in international law and the international order of the world, including a modernisation of the United Nations. For this reason I was especially pleased to accept the invitation to take part in the common deliberation on the realisation of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. Indeed I see in this Pact an opportunity to take that important step which will open wide the door of Europe, European values, legal, political, economic and security relations, institutions, prosperity and social security to the Balkans. For if Europe comes to the Balkans, then the Balkans will also come to Europe, and in this way it will cease to be a flashpoint of European instability.

The mechanism of the Stability Pact is set up in such a way that it should be possible to create a synergy of measures for lasting peace, and through development to modernise this region, which in many respects is still thinking, feeling and functioning along the lines of the 19th century, when nation states across Europe suppressed those who were different and attempted through political might and armies to align the state borders with the boundaries of their national territories. And the successful operation of the Stability Pact will also determine to a great extent the future of the Europe that is now uniting. For it is still divided into several different Europes. A responsibility towards reality demands that we acknowledge this fact: there is the European Union and the Atlantic alliance, there is a first and second class waiting room for entry into the EU and NATO, and there is a Europe of states which try to speak the language of democracy, but in truth maintain, even through aggressive nationalism, the old order and old thought patterns, and which seek alliances to resist the rule of universal human rights over national and state sovereignty.

The reasons for such an understanding of nations and nation states lie in the past. For it is in the past, as well as on the political maps of the Balkans that were continually redrawn by the victors of war and by the great powers of Europe, that we find the causes behind the feeling of national suppression experienced by many nations of Southeastern Europe. Therein lie the myths that are summoned into life today by aggressive nationalism which would use the populace for its own bloody ambitions. A common consideration of these causes will lead us all more securely to common views of a lasting political solution, in which there will no longer be any space for retrograde political thinking and conduct stemming from the 19th century.

Human rights, work, security and open borders for people, trade, economic development, capital and information, gradual inclusion in the stable Europe through development projects – these are the hopes for the turbulent part of Southeastern Europe. It is also the vital, long-term interest and duty of the peaceful, secure and developed part of our continent.

I am convinced that there exist certain principles on which we should insist, so that the Stability Pact can achieve its expected results and create the conditions for long-term stabilisation and European reintegration of the Balkans. I have summed these principles up in 16 brief points, which I shall not read out here – they are set out in my contribution to this conference – and which are an expression of my long years of political experience and direct dealings with the crisis in the area of former Yugoslavia:

1. A complete and integral view of the Balkans is essential. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Sandzak, potentially Macedonia, too, are all simply the visibly acute points of conflict. The isolated resolving of individual crisis points merely calms the conflict, but does not eradicate the causes of it.

2. At the root of the Balkan conflict lies the historical, unresolved national question of certain Balkan nations. The reasons for the conflict itself lie in the method of resolving this question, that is, through the historically outmoded concept of the nation state, built on the principle of ‘blood and soil’, and through the pursuit of securing and expanding national living space or lebensraum. The concept of a nationally pure state is the ideological and theoretical foundation of ethnic cleansing, genocide and the violent expulsion of those belonging to other national groups.

3. The nature of conflicts and wars, including the war against Bosnia-Herzegovina, needs to be clearly identified to demonstrate a clear view that these were wars of aggression, aimed at seizing territory and incorporating it into a greater nation state, that these wars were waged from centres in mother countries and that these wars are not yet over. For the political ideas which gave rise to them have not yet been superseded. The mistaken identification of the wars has generated mistaken measures by the international community.

4. In these conflicts, and in Kosovo too, we see an encounter between equal concepts of nationalist policy aimed at achieving ethnically cleansed territory, and making use of political and physical force – be it by the state or through illegal terrorism. The means are various, the aims are the same. In April 1987, in Kosovo polje, Milosevic was able to pronounce to the Serbs the fateful words “No one has the right to beat you up”, for Albanian police officers in Kosovo had indeed beaten up Serbs!

5. It will be necessary as a modern alternative to the outmoded concept of the nation state to implement elements of the citizens’ state, which does indeed have a clear national quality, but which is founded on the principle of equality of citizens regardless of their national, religious, ideological or conceptual affiliation, and on the principle of tolerance and openness to others.

6. The value system upon which these states will be built in the future must be founded on the rule of human rights, on respect for personal dignity, on the unique nature of life and personal freedom. For this reason effective protection of human individual, collective and especially minority rights must be built into their institutional mechanisms and legal system. The value system prevalent in the policies of the current regimes is essentially different. To a great extent it is a relic of the former bloc division of Europe from the times before the West, through the Helsinki Final Act and its ‘third basket’, entered the Eastern Bloc and from within demolished its ideology of collectivism and totalitarianism. A part of the Balkans, in particular present-day Serbia led by Milosevic, is in this respect still a ‘different bloc’, and from the aspect of accommodating the rule of human rights it is a different civilisation altogether.

7. The ideological and political confrontations in this region should not be replaced by scenarios of all-out wars between cultures or civilisations, which would justify fundamentalist aggression by invoking the defence of culture, faith or civilisation. In this multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious region, where three great civilisations meet, this is a real danger.

8. Taking into account specific features and cases, including those of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia, Kosovo must remain mixed in nationality and religion. Establishing mutual trust will not be possible without the trial and judgement of war crimes before the court in The Hague, and without making people face their own hatred and their own responsibility, for without this it is not possible to live with oneself, let alone lead a productive life with others. It will therefore be necessary for some time to use outside factors – peace-keeping forces, international civil administration, police and schools – to make up for the ruined mutual trust between peoples of different ethnicity or religion, and in this to build on the tradition of a common, tolerant and productive life, which has been destroyed by the nationalist policies of national political elites. Key importance must be ascribed here to the earliest possible return of refugees to their homes (and not just to their countries!) in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and to preventing violence which would generate continually new waves of refugees. International aid to refugees should focus on those locations that are their home, otherwise their repatriation will be rendered yet more difficult, and the policy of violent ethnic cleansing will become a reality.

9. Any speculation about drawing new political maps of the Balkans is unacceptable, both in the short term and the long term. What is needed is a firm and clear stance that the borders in the Balkans are in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act - that is, they must be open. No border can be controlled in such a way as to prevent the enmity to cross it. Long-term solutions cannot be found in the premise that Serbia will be ruled indefinitely by an undemocratic, nationalist and totalitarian regime incapable of coexistence with others, and that it is therefore possible to encroach on its territorial integrity. Such an approach would be a defeat for European democracy, and at the same time it would lead to decisions that would encroach on the legitimate interests of the Serbian nation and would bring about its historic humiliation, which would in turn be a source of new conflicts.

10. The stance on unalterability of borders through force in the Balkans urgently requires the unity of European countries, especially the large and influential ones. For the sake of our common future, every European country must take responsibility together for this stance. This would serve to reject any possibility of speculation with the one-time spheres of interest in the Balkans and speculation with partial or non-consensual alliances beyond declared unity.

11. In these positions and activities consideration must also be given to the place of Russia, in line with the general view that Russia cannot be excluded from the processes of European integration and cooperation. Russia must be seen as a partner, and this fact must be accommodated in the establishing of institutional frameworks and mechanisms of cooperation.

12. In the long term, consideration must be given to the demand for demilitarisation or the restricted arming of these countries, and in this way ending the traditional contest for the position of dominant regional military and political power in the Balkans. One salient issue here is the instruments of cooperation between these countries and European security institutions in preventing organised crime, traffic in arms and drugs and white slavery, all of which find a favourable environment in the conditions prevailing in that region.

13. In Kosovo, and in a certain way in Bosnia-Herzegovina, too (implementation of the Dayton Agreement), for some time an international civil administration will be needed (UN protectorate), and this should facilitate a normalisation of life, establish secure foundations for revival of the economy and for coexistence, and at the same time develop institutional, legal and political frameworks for a high level of autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia and the FR Yugoslavia. This autonomy will be founded on the multiethnicity of Kosovo and on the equality of all citizens. This should take into account the fact that in Kosovo the Albanians are the majority, and they must take on responsibility for safeguarding the equality of those people from other national groups – Serbs, Montenegrins and others – who are the minority. Everything else aside, the demographic trends in Kosovo are a real problem that cannot be ignored. The model of autonomy that will be evolved there (based on the Constitution of the SFR Yugoslavia from 1974) may also be used as a basis for autonomy in Vojvodina, which is becoming a new focus of unease in Serbia. Such autonomy must have permanent international guarantees.

14. Consideration must also be given to the forms and ways of developing modern political thoughts on the citizens’ state and the rule of human rights, on states based on the rule of law and an open society in these states, which should serve to create modern constitutions in these same states. This in turn should be served by the envisaged round tables on democracy, human rights and minorities, something which is also being actively promoted by Slovenia.

15. Work and free enterprise must be established as values, and as values that are common to all in everyday life and also realistically attainable. This should be facilitated by the promotion of economic development through enterprising project link-ups and opening these economies to more advanced countries, supported and stimulated by appropriate legal instruments of internal institutions and financial support, along with supervision from the more advanced countries. The proposals for free trade relations among the countries of Southeastern Europe make sense, but only if the path to the advanced economies is open. The shifting of small pockets of poverty does not produce a large pocket of wealth, but just a bigger pocket of poverty.

16. Careful consideration must also be given to the forms of economic and financial incentives, which should in no event be directed towards assisting the regimes in those countries, but towards economically justified financing of concrete infrastructural and enterprising projects, with careful supervision, towards technological and structural modernisation of these economies and the construction of modern banking and financial mechanisms capable of undertaking quality financial operations. Support could be provided here by the existing network of banks that are owned by partners from Western countries as well as from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, and which are still doing business in all the former territory. Slovenia itself possesses just such a network.

In Kosovo the worst is over, but now the most difficult part is coming, just as the most difficult time is coming for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and for all the western Balkans, including Bosnia-Herzegovina and in some way Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. Our greatest attention will need to be focused on this region for a long time to come. Renewal, the conceptual, political and economic reconstruction, the developmental impetus - this being a project of at least a decade - will be expensive, yet still less costly than any repetition of war, and will in any event be more humane.

The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe is entering a region where people still think and behave in historically outmoded ways. Yet Montenegro is now providing credible evidence that a different kind of Balkans is also possible. Such a path should also be chosen by Serbia, which is indeed capable of doing so, given its historically democratic tradition. It is up to Serbia itself when it will break with the Milosevic past. This will be a difficult process, perhaps even bloody. But there is no other choice. Just like the Albanians and others in the Balkans, the Serbs will have to renounce the nationalistic isolation of pursuing a greater state, and embark on the arduous path to democracy, human dignity, respect of differences - especially ethnic and religious – and to a better life. And all of us can and must help Serbia and others achieve this.

In all our actions we would be wise to remember that for at least the last ten years the Serbs have lived in one single reality, that is the reality of aggressive nationalism. They have become almost deaf to other messages, in some way even autistic. NATO’s intervention was a shock, a direct encounter with a different reality, which in fact brought with it a feeling of humiliation and doubt in anything that did not, together with the Belgrade nomenklatura, oppose the political and later military intervention by the Atlantic alliance. Immediate elections in Serbia, or even immediate special elections in Kosovo could today produce some surprising results, turned back to the past, for an imagined and clearly visible political choice is still lacking. There is a persistent belief that the choice is simply for or against Milosevic. And this is a choice between pitiful certainty and uncertainty. So there is therefore realism and sense in the suggestions that first the media environment should be given a professional ethic, and by demanding the abolition of the law limiting freedom of the press, the media should be made autonomous and pluralistic, and then modern political choices should be created and the latent democracy of Serbia’s citizens should be awakened.

When Europe, under the Stability Pact, enters completely into Southeastern Europe, there will be no stars showing the way through the smoke of the ruins. For this reason there is a need for informed and precise planning, which will also in substance, and not just in the mechanisms of the Stability Pact, provide for the mutual and harmonised functioning of all those involved.

The substance is sensitive and fragile, for the real substance of every action by Europe in this case is freedom. And freedom is not simply a free market, as was noted recently by a group of Amsterdam academics in their Alternative to Neoliberalism, and as we understand is a fixed point on the agenda of Europe’s social democrats. For the situation in the Balkans, particularly for the crisis points, I should reiterate: freedom is also respect of different peoples and beliefs, ethnic minorities and any kind of difference. Freedom is also help for the weak, solidarity, care for the environment and for a good infrastructure, which links people and opens up the world. Freedom is also work, which would return to people in the Balkans their personal dignity and gradually incorporate them into a modern system of work and life. And I see room for all these factors of renewal and reconstruction in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. And I believe that it will lead this part of Europe into a more agreeable century, if it can function with internal harmony and with some sensitivity for the people it is trying to help, so that they might be able to help themselves. Tragic experiences have been etched too often in Europe’s political memory. It is time now for us to learn from those experiences to live differently.